Rafael Sattarov
Political scientist, Washington
Not long ago, I met an old friend from Tashkent — a man from a conservative family in the Khasti-Imam district. We hadn’t seen each other for years, and I was ready to talk about everything: life, work, the many things we’d missed. But the conversation, almost inevitably, drifted to Gaza.
It struck me like a small version of the “six degrees of separation” theory: wherever you go, whoever you meet, the conversation somehow finds its way to Israel and Gaza. Over all these years, we had never discussed the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict or the issue of Karabakh. Yet, for two Uzbeks, Gaza suddenly became the central topic.
Solidarity Without Dividends
In global politics, this has become particularly visible: the Gaza issue, over the past two years, has spread far beyond its natural borders. Even summits of Turkic nations now somehow include discussions about the Middle East — as if solidarity must be proven through rhetoric about Palestine. By contrast, leaders of the Gulf states never spend their summits discussing the affairs of Turkic countries. The sheikhs of Riyadh or Abu Dhabi have no interest in the internal politics of Central Asia, just as they show little concern for the disputes between Pakistan and the Taliban in Afghanistan, despite having signed defense agreements with Islamabad.
As a political analyst, I’ve watched with growing disbelief how Central Asian states have, in recent years, become a corridor for the informational manipulations of Qatar, Iran, and Turkey. The emotional and propagandistic “injections” have begun to affect actual policymaking — producing statements and decisions that cannot be rationalized even by the most cynical observer. It brings no political dividends, only imitation and borrowed rhetoric.
Against this backdrop, Azerbaijan’s diplomacy — more independent and immune to emotional blackmail — has brought Baku significant political, diplomatic, and even financial dividends. Uzbekistan, for instance, has gained nothing beyond social media approval. No Central Asian leader was invited to the Cairo “Peace Summit for Gaza,” while both Armenia and Azerbaijan received invitations. Despite fierce criticism for its cooperation with Israel, Azerbaijan was not sidelined. On the contrary, over the past three years, it has consolidated its position in Israeli and Syrian energy projects, and today, in the Eastern Mediterranean, Azerbaijan has more room to maneuver than Turkey itself.
There is nothing shameful for Central Asian states in improving relations with Israel or deepening cooperation — even when certain actors criticize such moves. The Arab monarchies themselves have done so long ago, guided by their own interests, not slogans.
The Iran Problem
According to The Washington Post, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt — with U.S. mediation — have held secret meetings between their military officials to discuss coordination against their shared adversary: Iran. It is not Israel that flooded Arab streets with Captagon, nor Israeli forces that created the addiction crisis among segments of Arab youth. For the monarchies of the Middle East, Iran — and, to a lesser extent, Qatar — represent the true threat. It is worth recalling that long before Israel began speaking of Qatari influence, Saudi Arabia and the UAE accused Doha of sponsoring terrorism.
Central Asian countries maintain embassies in every key capital of the Middle East. One would assume that the analysts stationed there should be reporting the region’s real strategic dynamics. Yet judging by official positions, it seems many leaders are being briefed not with analytical reports, but with screenshots from social media.
Last week, Israel Hayom reported that Azerbaijan and Indonesia may lead international stabilization forces in Gaza — a multinational contingent of tens of thousands of troops. Israel reportedly vetoed Turkish participation, a move supported by the United States. Indonesia brings long experience from UN peacekeeping missions, while Azerbaijan is one of Israel’s closest security partners.
Azerbaijani Courage
Azerbaijan today stands among the few Muslim-majority states whose leadership has resisted emotional manipulation by foreign powers seeking to speak directly to their publics over the heads of their governments. The manipulative campaigns of Qatar, Turkey, and Iran have already pushed several Muslim nations into adopting positions that serve external agendas — rationalizing or romanticizing Hamas, even when such groups undermine their own national interests.
In Azerbaijan, such emotional blackmail has found little traction. Baku quietly dismissed the “Free Palestine” hysteria, despite being criticized by self-appointed guardians of Islamic authenticity. In its relationship with Israel, Azerbaijan has shown a political courage that many others — eager to be seen as part of the “Arab street” that never invited them — still lack.
It was telling that at the Cairo conference on Gaza, those most vocal in their performative outrage were neither invited nor heard.
This confirms a simple truth: Central Asia continues to emotionally drag itself into conflicts where its opinions are neither sought nor respected. Worse, many of its positions do not reflect the new geopolitical realities of the Middle East. In Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, statements from Central Asian leaders are increasingly read as echoes of Iran, Qatar, and Turkey — not as expressions of independent policy.
Azerbaijan, by contrast, remembers well the hypocrisy of global solidarity. When Azerbaijani territories were under occupation and hundreds of thousands of its citizens were displaced, no global protests or university boycotts followed. No “Free Karabakh” marches filled the streets of London or New York.
Baku understands the emptiness of this “keffiyeh dance” and refuses to enter a Qatari- or Iranian-led trance of global intifada.
Meanwhile, discussions in Washington suggest that Donald Trump’s administration plans to expand the Abraham Accords. Morocco, for instance, reaped significant rewards: normalization with Israel strengthened ties with Washington and resulted in U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. By late October 2025, even the United Nations Security Council recognized Western Sahara’s autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, described as the “most feasible solution” to a 50-year conflict.
The recent C5+1 Summit and Trump’s meeting with Central Asian leaders will likely clarify the region’s potential role in the Abraham Accords. The dividends — political, economic, and strategic — could be considerable.
Indonesia’s president, leader of the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, has already expressed his desire to visit Israel. Speculation abounds, but few doubt the visit will happen.
The real question is this: why should others take the initiative that rightfully belongs to Central Asia? Why shouldn’t Uzbekistan, or the region as a whole, take its own rational and sovereign step toward the future — without borrowing someone else’s keffiyeh?